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first briefly review previous studies in the literature, 
and then propose an extension of the approach aiming 
to improve its forecasting performance by estimating 
country-specific thresholds.
2. The signalling approach
The signalling approach to identifying fiscal stress 
basically consists of four steps. First, fiscal stress 
needs to be defined. In a second step, a set of “leading 
indicators” for fiscal stress is selected. In a third step, 
thresholds for each variable (maximising signalling 
power for a given signalling window)3 are calculated. In 
the fourth step, the variables are then aggregated into 
composite indices for signalling fiscal stress.
The analytical core of the approach is the way the 
thresholds for the different variables are calculated. 
Most common here is minimisation of the total 
misspecification error (TME), that is, maximisation of 
the signalling power. The total misspecification error 
(TME) is the sum of the Type I error (the fraction of 
noncrisis situations in which a crisis is signalled) and 
the Type II error (the fraction of crises in which no crisis 
is signalled); see Table 1. The signalling power is 
defined as one minus Type I error minus Type II error. In 
the final step, to calculate the composite indices for 
fiscal stress, the influence of the different variables is 
weighted with the signalling power. 
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The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has raised 
interest in early warning indicators, aimed at signalling 
the build-up of fiscal stress in advance and helping 
prevent crises by means of a timely counteraction of 
fiscal and macroeconomic policies. This paper presents 
possible improvements to enhance existing early 
warning indicators for fiscal stress, especially for the 
euro area. We show that a country-specific approach 
could strongly increase the signalling power of early 
warning systems. Finally, we draw policy conclusions 
for the setting-up and application of a system of early 
warning indicators for fiscal stress.
1  introduction
The sovereign debt crisis in some euro area countries 
increased the interest in early warning mechanisms 
that could indicate the buildup of fiscal stress early on, 
facilitating a timely counteraction by fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies. 
The literature on early warning indicators is dominated 
by the so-called signalling approach, which derives 
critical thresholds for fiscal and financial variables 
indicating fiscal stress.1 This approach was pioneered by 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky 
and reinhart (1999), and was first applied to currency 
crises. Currently the signalling approach has become 
prominent with respect to early warning indicators for 
fiscal stress (e.g. Baldacci et al., 2011, or European 
Commission, 2011). 
This paper aims to further develop the existing 
signalling approach, especially for the euro area.2 We 
1  Some authors prefer the term “fiscal crisis” but we generally 
use “fiscal stress”. 
2  An alternative approach to the early warning mechanisms pur-
sued here is the estimation of critical debt limits (based on 
countries’ fiscal reaction to debt increases in the past) and the 
remaining “fiscal space”. See, for example, Ostry et al. (2010). 
3  Here the signalling window is generally set to one year, 
meaning that the signalling power of a variable in t-1 for a 
crisis in t is evaluated. 
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specific factors are fully ignored, even though they are 
likely to be important in defining and anticipating fiscal 
stress situations. on the other hand, the resultant common 
thresholds might become very sensitive to outliers.
Moreover it is usual in the literature to evaluate the 
signalling power of the methodology only “in-sample”. 
However, we argue that for an early warning system the 
forward-looking “out-of-sample” forecast performance 
is important.
3  Country-specific thresholds and out-of-sample 
evaluation
In this paper, we begin by building on the same dataset 
and crisis definition considered in previous studies 
(e.g. Baldacci et al., 2011, or European Commission, 
2011). However, we propose to estimate country-
specific thresholds for the indicator variables, which 
take the (potentially large) differences between the 
countries in the sample into account.5
Estimation results in Table 2 indicate that country-
specific thresholds vary strongly over our sample. 
Previous research on early warning indicators for fiscal 
stress is generally based on this signalling approach, 
considering common thresholds for all the countries in 
the sample. For instance, the European Commission 
(2011) applied the general signalling approach to a 
large dataset (covering 27 fiscal and financial variables 
in a panel of 33 developed countries from 1970-2010),4 
adopting the fiscal stress definition of Baldacci et al. 
(2011). Under this definition, fiscal stress is indicated if 
any of the following four criteria are satisfied: i) inflation 
rate above 35%, ii) significant sovereign bond yield 
spreads (2 standard deviations above their country-
specific mean), iii) public debt default/restructuring/
rescheduling and/or iv) a large-scale IMF-supported 
programme. 
We argue that two caveats are relevant within this 
common-threshold approach. on the one hand, country-
4  The countries covered are the EU (without Cyprus, 
Luxembourg and Malta) and Australia, Canada, Iceland, 
Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the US.
5  One precondition for this country-specific analysis is that the 
countries concerned need to have at least one crisis episode 
in the sample in order for country-specific thresholds to be 
determined. For countries without a crisis, we set the 
maximum or minimum value observed for the variable as the 
threshold for fiscal stress. 
                                        
Crisis episode Non-crisis episode
Crisis signal True Positive signal False Positive signal
(Type I error)
Non-crisis signal False Negative signal
(Type II error)
True Negative signal
SIGNALS AND ERRORS WITHIN 
THE SIGNALLING APPROACH 
TABLE 1
a Variables labelled with (+) are those that indicate an early warning when they exceed the value of the estimated threshold (e.g. gross debt as a share of GDP). 
Analogously, those variables with a (-) generate an early warning when taking a value below the estimated threshold (e.g. primary balance as a share of GDP).
                                        
Gross debt,
% GDP (+)
Change in gross debt,
% GDP (+)
Change in public 
expenditure,
% GDP (+)
Primary balance,
% GDP (–)
Overall index (+)
AUT 72.26 6.02 4.36 -1.99 0.21
BEL 134.24 12.44 6.66 -7.39 0.42
DEU 17.69 -0.43 0.59 2.23 0.99
ESP 53.26 13.41 4.51 -8.34 0.99
FIN 14.49 6.41 8.92 0.91 0.57
FRA 81.70 10.60 -0.06 -4.80 0.55
GRC 78.37 -0.69 1.49 -0.65 0.89
IRL 25.01 -2.85 -0.14 1.12 0.85
ITA 50.26 -3.03 -1.19 -4.06 0.80
NLD 78.48 12.92 5.31 -3.58 0.15
PRT 68.27 3.51 5.13 -0.21 0.58
Common 103.62 6.59 -2.39 -0.65 0.37
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC THRESHOLDS FOR SELECTED VARIABLES (a) TABLE 2
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—  The signalling power of the overall index is 
strongly increased from 0.56 in the common 
threshold approach to 0.95 in the country-
specific approach. In particular, the Type II error 
can be completely eliminated. This means that 
the overall index with the country-specific 
threshold does not miss any crisis event.
—  The increase in signalling power of the fiscal 
index is even stronger than that of the overall 
index – suggesting a larger role of country 
heterogeneity with respect to the fiscal 
variables. Here the signalling power increases 
from 0.22 in the common threshold approach 
to 0.88 in the country-specific approach. The 
Type II error indicates that only 4% of crisis 
episodes are missed by the fiscal index. 
—  The signalling power of the financial-
competitiveness index increases as well – but 
on a higher level: from 0.50 to 0.87. Thus, the 
financial-competitiveness index has slightly 
less predictive power for fiscal crises than the 
fiscal index. 
Additionally, we argue in favour of the importance of 
out-of sample forecasts. Indeed, the improvement in 
terms of in-sample performance described above 
might result obvious ex-ante since it amounts to 
relaxing a homogeneity restriction on the thresholds, 
so the estimation criterion cannot worsen. In order to 
consider out-of-sample forecasts, we first estimated 
the thresholds based on the data from 1970-2000 and 
then analyzed the out-of-sample forecast performance 
While the threshold for the debt level is found to be 
103.6% when common thresholds are estimated, the 
country-specific estimate is usually found to be much 
lower. For example, for the Netherlands, the estimate is 
78.48% of GdP. However, the results also point at an 
important remaining weakness of the approach. For 
Germany the only crisis in the sample is recorded in 
1974, when the debt level stood at 17.7% of GdP. This 
led then to the estimation of a very low country-specific 
debt threshold, which is economically not meaningful. 
However, this seems to be a problem resulting not so 
much from country-specific thresholds, but from the 
crisis definition and the number of crisis episodes.6 
How does our country-specific approach affect 
signalling power? detailed analyses reported in the 
paper lead to the conclusion that the country-specific 
approach strongly increases the signalling power of all 
variables and therefore of the overall fiscal stress 
indices too. 
Table 3 demonstrates this improvement with respect to 
the composite indices. In addition to the overall index, 
encompassing 27 variables, the paper also constructs an 
index of 13 variables related to the country’s fiscal stance, 
and an index of 14 financial and competitiveness variables 
(see the Working Paper for a detailed description of the 
variables, which are taken from European Commission, 
2011). With respect to in-sample performance, three 
aspects should be noted:
6  In any event, note that when computing the composite 
indices, the influence of the different variables is weighted 
with their signalling power.  
NOTES: Type I error is the ratio of false positives to the number of no-crisis observations. Type II error is the ratio of false negatives to the number of crisis 
observations. Signalling power is defined as1 – Type I – Type II. The percentage of true positives equals 1 – Type II; the percentage of true negatives is 1 – Type I.
                                        
Overall index Fiscal index Financial index
Sig. Power 0.56 0.22 0.50
Type I 0.24 0.15 0.26
Type II 0.20 0.64 0.24
Sig. Power 0.95 0.88 0.87
Type I 0.05 0.09 0.06
Type II 0.00 0.04 0.07
Sig. Power 0.42 0.13 0.47
Type I 0.40 0.05 0.36
Type II 0.18 0.82 0.18
Sig. Power 0.77 0.58 0.79
Type I 0.18 0.24 0.16
Type II 0.06 0.18 0.06
Common
Country-specific
Common
Country-specific
In-sample
Out-of-sample
SIGNALLING POWER OF OVERALL, FISCAL AND FINANCIAL-COMPETITIVENESS INDICES  TABLE 3
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the signalling power of fiscal variables – indicating that 
an early warning system should pay particular attention 
to differences across countries in the fiscal realm.
our consideration of out-of sample performance further 
supports our country-specific approach. Country-
specific thresholds perform much better for out-of-
sample forecasts, whereas the common threshold 
fiscal index loses a lot of signalling power in the out-of-
sample forecast. This can be seen as an indication that 
country heterogeneity in the fiscal sphere has strongly 
increased after 2000, further reducing the predictive 
power of the common threshold approach.
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on the remaining data from 2000-2010. Here the 
following three results should be stressed: 
—  The signalling power decreases for all indices 
(common and country-specific thresholds). 
However, with respect to the overall index the 
reduction is fairly moderate.
—  The fiscal index based on the common threshold 
is nearly rendered meaningless for the out-of 
sample forecast. Its signalling power decreases 
to 0.13 and it misses 82% of the crisis episodes.7 
one explanation for this result could be that 
country heterogeneity has strongly increased 
after 2000, further reducing the predictive power 
of the common threshold approach. 
—  With respect to the financial index based on 
the country-specific threshold the reduction 
is far less strong and the index misses only 
6% of the crisis episodes. This suggests that 
country heterogeneity has not increased as 
much as in the fiscal sphere. 
4 Concluding remarks
This paper introduces country-specific thresholds for 
fiscal stress, and analyzes both in-sample and out-of-
sample forecast performance, following the signalling 
approach commonly used in the literature.
our analyses show that country-specific thresholds 
vary strongly and substantially increase the signalling 
power of all variables and of the composite indices. 
Country-specific thresholds are especially important for 
7  Note that the signalling power can also take negative values.
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thE spaNIsh prOductIvItY puzzLE IN thE GrEat 
rEcEssION
LAUrA HoSPIdo ANd EvA MorENo-GALBIS
WorKING PAPEr #1501
While Spain has traditionally underperformed its European 
neighbors in terms of labor productivity, this trend 
reverses after 2007. Part of the explanation for this 
reversal is likely to be the direct impact of decreasing 
labor inputs relative to capital. Using a longitudinal sample 
of Spanish manufacturing and services companies 
between 1995 and 2012, we show that the recent 
increase in Spanish aggregate productivity is also driven 
by the behavior of firm-level total factor productivity 
(TFP), and by composition effects. Turning to the 
correlates of firm TFP, by combining firm-level information 
on balance sheet items, collective agreements and 
imports/exports, we find that firm TFP is positively 
correlated to firm-specific collective agreements and 
access to external markets during the whole period. In 
addition, our estimates indicate that firm TFP was 
negatively correlated to the proportion of temporary 
workers during the expansionary period (1995-2007), but 
positively correlated during the crisis (2008-2012).
1  introduction
The divergent productivity growth experiences of the 
United States and various countries in Europe during 
the current economic crisis highlight the importance of 
understanding the factors underlying labor productivity 
growth (see Figure 1). In particular, the slowdown of 
Spanish labor productivity growth between the mid-
1990s and 2000s contrasts with the positive productivity 
growth in the US and other European countries. Since 
2007, the differential has mostly gone in the opposite 
direction. determining the temporary or permanent 
nature of the factors underlying recent productivity 
growth is important for predicting Spanish future 
competitiveness. 
From an accounting point of view, GdP per capita can 
be decomposed into labor productivity and employment 
(measured as number of workers or hours of work). In 
Spain, the divergent evolution of GdP per capita and of 
labor productivity during the recent crisis is clearly 
related to the very adverse conditions in the labor 
market. Since 2007, unemployment has increased 
(particularly for men due to the downsizing of the 
construction sector), reaching 25% of the active 
population in 2012, and 40% for people between 16 
and 29 years old. This evolution of the unemployment 
rate is mainly due to the massive destruction of jobs 
rather than the arrival of new entrants into the labor 
market. Moreover, job destruction has disproportionately 
affected employees with temporary contracts, which 
are usually associated with low productivity positions. 
Thus, the recent improvement in aggregate labor 
productivity could be related to a sharp drop in 
employment while the other factors of production 
remain fairly constant, but it could also be a composition 
effect due to the massive destruction of less productive 
positions. 
This study estimates the evolution of total factor 
productivity (TFP) in Spain during the period 1995-
2012, motivated by the role of TFP as the most 
informative predictor of future trends in labor 
productivity. We ask first whether the evolution of 
aggregate TFP results from a change in the TFP level of 
the majority of firms or if it instead reflects composition 
effects. Second, we study the relationship between the 
evolution of TFP at the firm level and available margins 
of adjustment, such as the mix of labor contracts used 
by the firm, the type of collective agreement, and the 
possibility of exporting or importing from abroad. In 
particular, we focus on the importance of these flexibility 
margins during the recent economic crisis (2008-2012).
2. Measuring TFp
Data sources
We combine information from several data sources. 
data on the annual accounts of firms and on the 
number of employees by type of contract, capital, and 
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SOURCE: OECD. Labor productivity defined as GDP per hour worked. 
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inverted to obtain ω it = ω t (m it,k it ), under monotonicity 
plus some additional assumptions. 
In general, Levinsohn and Petrin’s method estimates 
the intermediate inputs elasticity β M. But they point out
1 
that under perfect competition, a separable production 
function, and some additional assumptions, (1) also 
applies to value added v it, suppressing materials on the 
right-hand side. The equation becomes
v it =   β L l it + φ t (m it,k it )+ε it,   (3)
where φ t (m it,k it )=β 0 + β K k it + ω t (m it,k it ). In practice, we 
approximate φ t(m it,k it) by means of a third-order 
polynomial in m it and k it. Then equation (3) is estimated 
by oLS in a first stage to get the estimated coefficient β L.
2
A second stage of the routine identifies β K. Assuming 
that ω it is governed by a first-order Markov process, 
and that capital is predetermined, so that k it does not 
respond to the time t innovation in productivity, the 
estimated coefficient β K is found by minimizing a sum 
of squares that represents i.i.d. residuals. 
Evolution of the estimated TFP
once the technological parameters have been 
obtained, we recover our predicted TFP by plugging 
the estimated coefficients in the production function:
(
^
TFP) it ≡ exp (ω^  it ) = exp (v it – β^ L l it – β^ K k it ),
where v it is the log of value added, that is, gross output 
net of intermediate inputs’ contribution. Since TFP is 
estimated as a residual, we have different TFP 
estimations for each of the different model specifications 
and subsamples that we consider.3 
Figure 2 compares the evolution of the average TFP 
growth at the firm level (left hand side panel), with that 
at the aggregate level (right panel). We can see that the 
growth rate of the average firm’s TFP has been 
continuously negative and decreasing since the 
beginning of the crisis (between 2010 and 2012 there is 
intermediate inputs were obtained from the Banco de 
España’s Central Balance Sheet data office (CBSo) 
and from the Mercantile registries. Information on the 
type of collective agreements comes from the Collective 
Agreement registries. Finally, information on imports 
and exports is provided by the Balance of Payment 
registries. The final sample is an unbalanced panel of 
964,284 manufacturing and non-financial firms with 
5,627,598 annual observations from 1995 to 2012.
Estimation of the production function
TFP is measured at the firm level as a residual from an 
estimate of the production technology obtained using a 
measure of output and information on the amounts of 
all the observable inputs. We characterize technology 
as a Cobb-douglas production function with a 
logarithmic specification on gross output and inputs:
y it = β 0 + β L l it + β M m it + β K k it + u it  (1)
u it = ω it + ε it     (2)
where, for each firm i in year t, y it denotes the log of 
gross real output; l it and m it, denote the logs of labor 
and intermediate inputs, respectively; k it is the log of 
the fixed capital stock, and u it is a random term 
containing any unobserved factors affecting production. 
In particular, we assume that u it is the sum of two 
terms: the random variable ω it, which represents firm-
specific factors that affect productivity, such as 
managerial ability, firm specific human capital, 
efficiency in the use of technology and inputs, known 
by the firm when choosing labor and intermediate 
inputs but unobserved to the econometrician; and the 
random variable ε it, an idiosyncratic term that includes 
measurement error in output or shocks affecting output 
that are unknown when the firm decides the amount of 
inputs. The random variable ω it, usually called TFP, 
should affect input decisions, whereas ε it is assumed to 
be independent of ω it and other inputs. 
In this framework a classical endogeneity problem 
arises from the fact that ω it may be correlated with 
input choices. To overcome this problem we use the 
control function approach proposed by olley and 
Pakes (1996). oP assume ω it follows a first-order 
Markov process, without requiring any parametric 
assumption. Instead of instrumenting the endogenous 
regressors, they include other decision variables – such 
as investment - monotonically related with the 
productivity shock. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
propose to use intermediate inputs, which (unlike 
investment) are likely to be nonzero at all times. In this 
case, the materials demand function m it = m t (ω it,k it ) is 
1  See their Appendix B.
2  To allow for differences across industries, we estimate a pro-
duction function for each economic sector separately. We 
consider a 10-sector classification: Agriculture, Extractive, 
Manufacture, Energy, Construction, Sales, Transport, Tour-
ism, Education-Health, Other non-financial services.
3  Figure 2 reports estimates for the cases where production co-
efficients are estimated: (i) for the whole period; (ii) by sub-
periods (1995-2007 versus 2008-2012); and (iii) for the 
whole period in a balanced panel of firms.
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have entered during or after the crisis are especially 
productive.
3 adjustment margins
Finally, we quantify the relationship between firm TFP 
and some margins that companies have in order to 
adjust to changing economic conditions. More 
precisely, we consider two distinct types of adjustment 
margins. on the one hand, input adjustment margins 
concern the type of contract proposed to workers or 
the type of collective agreement. on the other hand, 
the output adjustment margin concerns the markets 
where firms sell their products. 
Estimation results
Formally, we regress log TFP for firm i in year t, ω^  it, on a 
set of variables including input and output adjustment 
margins:
ω^  it 
  = ηi + η t + γ a a it + γ z z it + τ it
where a it stands for the adjustment margins, η i and η t 
are the firm fixed effects and time dummies, respectively, 
z it includes dummies on the firm’s size, age, region of 
location and indicators of the firm debt structure, and 
τ it stands for the random error term. 
Similarly to Alonso-Borrego (2010), it is important to 
note that given the lack of a theoretical model to justify 
the set of explanatory variables, our estimates are 
capturing partial correlations, which cannot be given a 
causal interpretation. The evidence provided can only 
help to understand what variables are related to TFP, 
but further research is needed to support a causal 
interpretation of the estimated effects.
Table 1 reports fixed effects estimates of the correlation 
between the adjustment margins and firms’ TFP. The 
first column considers the whole sample of firms and 
the third column adds financial ratios. The debt ratio is 
defined as the ratio between the firm’s debt (long run 
and short run debts) over its equity. The short term 
debt ratio is defined as the share of short run debts 
over total debts. These two ratios are only available in 
our sample for firms classified as reliable by the CBSo 
according to several statistical criteria. Thus, to assess 
the possible existence of sample selection, column 2 
considers the subsample of firms for which we have 
information on the financial ratios.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the estimations 
reported in table 1. First, we find that the share of 
a slight increase in the growth rate, though it remains 
below –5%). For aggregate TFP, the growth rate is 
negative but closer to zero during the crisis period. 
Moreover, in 2012 the growth rate becomes positive. 
Thus, composition effects seem to have played a major 
role in explaining the better performance of TFP at the 
macro level. That is, firms having a relatively larger size 
within the total population of firms have displayed a 
rising behavior of TFP during the crisis which has 
partially compensated the bad TFP performance of the 
vast majority of (smaller) firms. 
Moreover, if we look within the balanced sample of 
firms (orange lines, representing firms that are present 
through the whole period) the evolution of aggregate 
TFP is not so different from that of the average firm. 
The lower average productivity in the balanced sample 
(orange) compared with unbalanced sample (blue) in 
the top panel indicates that some highly productive 
firms were nipped in the bud by the crisis. But in the 
bottom panel, we see that the balanced sample is 
initially much more productive in the aggregate than 
the unbalanced sample, indicating that the recession 
especially destroyed large firms with low TFP growth. 
In addition, the figure shows that among firms that 
survived the crisis, larger ones are more productive 
than the average and, moreover, large new firms that 
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with a larger share of temporary workers perform worse 
in TFP terms during years preceding the crisis. This 
situation is though reversed from 2009. Firms with a 
larger share of temporary workers perform increasingly 
better during the period 2009-2012. This sign reversal 
could be explained by the massive destruction of 
temporary jobs that yielded a selection process. It 
appears that highly productive firms are now quickly 
hiring temporary workers, and it is likely that these new 
workers have different characteristics from those 
occupying temporary positions during years preceding 
temporary workers is negatively correlated with TFP 
performance during the considered period, 1995-2012. 
Firms with a larger share of temporary workers are 
associated with poorer performance in terms of TFP. 
Second, firms having signed a collective agreement at 
the firm level perform better, in terms of TFP, than firms 
subject to a sectoral agreement. Third, being an 
importer-exporter positively correlates with TFP 
performance, whatever the definition we adopt for this 
indicator. Fourth, a negative and significant correlation 
arises between the debt ratio and TFP. Similarly, the 
short term debt ratio negatively correlates with TFP.
Time variation
In order to assess how the relationship of adjustment 
margins with TFP varies over time, we also allow the 
coefficients on the adjustment margins to vary year by 
year. The time variation of coefficients associated with 
the share of temporary workers, the firm agreement level 
and the use of foreign markets is displayed in Figure 3. 
As previously, we control for time dummies, debt ratios 
and for indicators of firms’ size, age, region and sector.
results show that firms committed to a collective 
agreement at the firm level perform better than the 
average in TFP terms since the beginning of the crisis, 
although the estimated effect is imprecise. Similarly, 
firms using external markets perform better than 
average since the late nineties. on the contrary, firms 
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TIME VARIATION IN ADJUSTMENT MARGINS FIGURE 3
 
NOTES: Estimates from firm fixed effects regressions of TFP on fim's age, 
size, region, sector, debt ratios, adjustment indicators, and interactions of 
these latter with time dummies.  
Full sample Sample with financial data Controlling for financial data
Share of temporary workers -0.051*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Importer-exporter 0.086*** 0.060*** 0.063***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm agreement 0.122*** 0.075*** 0.076***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Province agreement -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Regional agreement -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
National agreement -0.006*** -0.004 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Debt ratio -0.046***
(0.001)
Short term debt ratio -0.005***
(0.000)
    Observations 5,618,004 2,862,843 2,862,843
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSIONS OF ESTIMATED TFP  TABLE 1
  
 
 NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Firm's size, age, year, region and sector dummies included. *** Significant at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level, respectively.
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display better TFP performance than firms engaged in 
sectoral collective agreements over the whole period. 
Firms that are exporters or importers also display a 
better TFP behavior than average.
In sum, the recent upsurge in Spanish productivity may 
not be explained entirely by permanent factors, as 
average TFP has decreased during the crisis period. 
Instead, the recent improvement in labor productivity 
results from massive jobs destruction, and an increased 
weight of large firms displaying better TFP performance. 
This second effect, however, might be permanent to 
some extent.
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the crisis. Indeed, administrative records show that the 
proportion of high-skilled workers has increased 
among temporary employees since 2007.
4 Conclusions
This paper seeks to gain insights on the apparently 
puzzling behavior of labor productivity in Spain during 
the economic crisis. While Spain had traditionally 
underperformed its European counterparts in terms of 
productivity, the trend is reversed during the crisis. 
Since 2007 Spain displays growth rates of aggregate 
labor productivity which are above France, Germany, 
the UK and the US. our analysis shows that this 
behavior of Spanish labor productivity results from a 
composition effect, with larger firms displaying a better 
TFP performance during the crisis.
our estimates suggest that, while the share of 
temporary workers is negatively correlated to TFP 
during the whole period 1995-2012, when we focus on 
the crisis period, the sign of this correlation is reversed. 
Again, compositional changes in the population of 
temporary workers during the crisis may justify this 
sign reversal. on the other hand, firms having 
committed to a collective agreement at the firm level 
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FINaNcIaL INNOvatION IN sOvErEIGN BOrrOWING  
aNd puBLIc prOvIsION OF LIQuIdItY
PATrICIA GÓMEz GoNzÁLEz 
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1511
This paper studies how financial innovation in sovereign 
debt markets can increase a country’s level of private 
investment and welfare. I propose a model where public 
debt has a liquidity purpose for the domestic private 
sector and is demanded as a saving vehicle by more 
patient international investors. The public bond is risky: it 
has a low (high) return when the government’s fiscal 
capacity is low (high), but the government cannot 
strategically default on it. The main result of the paper is 
that the government can increase private investment by 
increasing the number of assets supplied, tranching its 
fiscal capacity, and issuing a safe and a risky bond. The 
risky bond is held only by international investors and the 
domestic private sector demands the safe bonds. Safe 
bonds lower the cost of liquidity hoarding for the private 
sector which enables it to increase investment. I test the 
predictions of the model using a dataset on public debt 
and local currency sovereign debt ownership for a group 
of emerging economies. I find that domestic collateral 
constraints are key determinants of the shares held 
abroad of total public debt, and especially of relatively 
riskier debt instruments (local currency debt). 
1  Financial innovation, sovereign debt ownership and 
portfolio composition 
The set of instruments governments issue is large and 
has expanded over time. They issue debt with different 
maturities and in different currencies, as well as bonds 
indexed to inflation or to some reference interest rate. 
Financial innovation has transformed sovereign debt 
markets of advanced and emerging economies and 
this process is still ongoing.
Apart from a large variety of financial instruments in 
sovereign debt markets, there is also a large variety of 
investors. recently there have been sizeable shifts in 
sovereign debt ownership. First, after the financial 
crisis, financial institutions in emerging and advanced 
economies increased their holdings of their own 
sovereign debt, while at the same time less was held 
abroad. Also, there have been changes in portfolio 
composition: foreign investors are increasingly holding 
more local currency (LC) debt. Furthermore, the share 
of LC debt that is held abroad is closely correlated with 
the strength of collateral constraints in the domestic 
economy (see figure 1).
2  a stylized model of risky sovereign debt
This paper proposes a three-period model where the 
local private sector has an investment opportunity and 
buys public debt to hoard liquidity for an uncertain 
future liquidity shock. After the shock hits the project 
can be downsized. However, it is socially desirable to 
always continue the project at full scale. Sovereign 
debt markets are also open to more patient risk-neutral 
international investors who demand the public assets 
as a savings vehicle. 
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model with two assets predicts that when collateral 
constraints tighten there is an shift towards international 
holding of riskier debt instruments, since these are less 
useful as collateral for the domestic private sector. 
An increase in the government’s fiscal capacity in the 
bad state in the future is associated with less sovereign 
debt held domestically in the baseline model and an 
international shift to safer debt instruments because a 
smaller share of the safe asset is needed at home. 
Finally an increase in the international discount factor, 
which captures the world demand for assets, crowds 
out domestic demand for sovereign debt and for the 
relatively safer debt instrument, resulting in decreased 
domestic investment.
5 Empirical analysis
Using a quarterly panel dataset of 21 emerging 
economies between 2004 and 2010, the paper tests 
the aforementioned comparative statics. 
The relatively riskier debt instrument in the data is 
interpreted as local currency debt, since devaluations 
occur more frequently in bad times. Tightening of 
collateral constraints is measured as decreases in local 
credit available and reductions in banks’ leverage. 
Fiscal capacity is measured by tax revenues over GdP, 
and the international discount factor is measured by the 
inverse of the federal funds rate. 
In addition to the variables of interest mentioned above, 
the regression analyses that test the predictions include 
country and time fixed effects, and a battery of 
additional controls (GdP growth, stock of debt, political 
The government’s future fiscal capacity is uncertain, 
which renders public debt risky. Likewise, the private 
sector’s liquidity needs are uncertain.  For simplicity, 
uncertainty is modeled by assuming two possible 
states of the world, in which the public and private 
sector shocks are perfectly correlated. one is a bad 
state, where public fiscal capacity is low and the private 
sector needs outside liquidity to continue the project at 
full scale; the other is a good state where fiscal capacity 
is high and the project can be self-financed by the 
private sector. 
3. Main result and optimal financial innovation
Consider first the case where the government sells just 
one type of public asset. The main result of the model 
in this case is that productive domestic investment 
decreases with the ratio between the public fiscal 
capacity in good times and that in bad times. Since the 
payoff of the asset is determined by the government’s 
fiscal capacity, this ratio parameterizes the amount of 
wasted liquidity the private sector holds in good times 
in order to finance its liquidity needs in bad times. 
To analyze possible improvements in liquidity provision, 
the paper also considers the case where the government 
may issue more than one asset in sovereign debt 
markets. In doing so, the government will internalize 
the behavior of the private sector. It is constrained by 
its fiscal capacity and also by a monotonicity 
assumption: for realism, it is assumed that the 
government cannot introduce assets that pay more in 
bad times than in good times. 
In this setup, the government´s optimal financial 
innovation is to tranch its fiscal capacity and introduce 
two types of bonds. optimally, it should issue one senior 
bond that pays a safe return, and a junior bond which 
pays the residual fiscal capacity. In equilibrium, the 
riskless asset is demanded by the domestic private 
sector, while the risky asset is bought exclusively by 
international investors. This solution increases productive 
investment at home since the availability of senior bonds 
decreases the amount of wasted liquidity the private 
sector has to buy. This financial innovation caters to the 
different motives investors have to hold public debt. 
4  Comparative statics
The baseline model with one asset predicts that a 
tightening of collateral constraints brings about a 
repatriation of sovereign debt to act as collateral. The 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
AND SOVEREIGN DEBT OWNERSHIP 
SOURCE: Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) and World Bank Indicators.. 
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Exploring how the global financial crisis affected sovereign 
debt ownership can shed some light on the effects of 
tighter collateral constraints. Figure 2 plots the change in 
the share of sovereign debt that is held abroad against the 
change in inverse leverage, both between 2007Q4 and 
2008Q4. Indeed, we see that those countries whose 
banks’ leverage decrease more, and thus experience a 
more severe tightening of collateral constraints, experience 
larger sovereign debt repatriations.
risk, financial openness, and the nominal exchange 
rate, among others).
The main comparative statics of both models are 
supported by the data. However, it is the domestic 
liquidity conditions (measured by local credit available 
and banks’ leverage) that emerge as crucial and robust 
in determining the share of sovereign debt held abroad, 
and the share of LC debt held abroad. 
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RECENT wORkiNg PAPERS
LINk tO WOrkING papErs paGE
rEaL-tIME FOrEcastING us Gdp FrOM sMaLL-scaLE 
FactOr MOdELs
MÁxIMo CAMACHo ANd JAIME MArTíNEz-MArTíN
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1425
We show that the single-index dynamic factor model 
developed by Aruoba and diebold (Am Econ rev, 
100:20-24, 2010) to construct an index of US business 
cycle conditions is also very useful for forecasting US 
GdP growth in real time. In addition, we adapt the 
model to include survey data and financial indicators. 
We find that our extension is unequivocally the preferred 
alternative for computing backcasts. In nowcasting 
and forecasting, our model is able to forecast growth 
as well as Ad and better than several baseline 
alternatives. Finally, we show that our extension could 
also be used to infer US business cycles with great 
accuracy.
prOductIvItY aNd WELFarE: aN appLIcatION tO thE 
spaNIsh BaNkING INdustrY 
ALFrEdo MArTíN oLIvEr, SoNIA rUANo PArdo ANd vICENTE SALAS 
FUMÁS
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1426
This paper examines the links between productivity 
and social welfare, with an application to the banking 
industry. It models spatial price competition between 
bank branches jointly with banks’ decisions on the 
opening or closing of branches based on profit 
expectations. The model predicts that more productive 
banks set lower (higher) interest rates on loans 
(deposits) and increase their market share through both 
higher demand per branch and a larger network of 
branches. Specifically, the paper i) uses a new measure 
of bank productivity; ii) provides a productivity 
differences-based explanation of the distance between 
bank branches and bank customers; and iii) shows 
how the intensity of market competition may be 
unaffected when the number of banks decreases, 
provided that banks continue expanding their branch 
network. The empirical implementation of the model 
uses Spanish banks over the period 1993-2007 and it 
confirms the theoretical predictions of the paper.
INFLatION dYNaMIcs IN a MOdEL WIth FIrM ENtrY aNd 
(sOME) hEtErOGENEItY 
JAvIEr ANdréS ANd PABLo BUrrIEL
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1427
We analyse the incidence of endogenous entry and firm 
TFP-heterogeneity on the response of aggregate 
inflation to exogenous shocks. We build up an otherwise 
standard dSGE model in which the number of firms is 
endogenously determined and firms differ in their steady 
state level of productivity. This splits the industry 
structure into firms of different sizes. Calibrating the 
different transition rates, across firm sizes and out of the 
market we reproduce the main features of the distribution 
of firms in Spain. We then compare the inflation response 
to technology, interest rate and entry cost shocks, 
among others. We find that structures in which large 
(more productive) firms predominate tend to deliver 
more muted inflation responses to exogenous shocks.
sOvErEIGN ratINGs aNd thEIr asYMMEtrIc rEspONsE tO 
FuNdaMENtaLs 
CArMEN BroTo ANd LUIS MoLINA
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1428
Changes in sovereign ratings are strongly asymmetric, 
as downgrades tend to be deeper and faster than 
upgrades. In other words, once a country loses its 
initial status it takes a long time to recover it. Using 
S&P data, we characterise “rating cycles” in terms of 
their duration and amplitude. We then study whether 
the agency reaction to new economic and financial 
domestic information also differs during upgrade and 
downgrade phases. our results indicate that favourable 
fundamentals could be helpful for smoothing and 
slowing down the path of downgrades, whereas 
favourable fundamentals do not seem to accelerate the 
rating recovery.
puBLIcatIONs 
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examining its correlation with the location quotients of 
several knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) 
known to be highly sensitive to urbanisation economies. 
The Arriaga index correlations are clearly stronger than 
those of either the classical degree of urbanisation or the 
Hirshman-Herfindahl concentration index.
cONtract staGGErING aNd uNEMpLOYMENt durING thE 
GrEat rEcEssION: EvIdENcE FrOM spaIN 
LUIS díEz-CATALÁN ANd ErNESTo vILLANUEvA
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1431
We study the impact of (widespread) downward wage 
rigidity on the flows from employment to non-
employment at the onset of the Great recession. 
downward wage (growth) rigidity is due to the fact that 
sector-level collective agreements in Spain are 
automatically extended to all firms, setting wage 
minima for workers in the same province-industry-skill 
cell. We identify the impact of wage rigidity on 
employment because, unlike settled ones, newly 
bargained contracts can adjust to aggregate shocks. 
Using the exact dates of bargaining periods of all 
sector-level contracts in Spain, we find that agreements 
reached after the fall of Lehman Brothers were for an 
average wage growth of 1.8%, while agreements 
signed before 15 September 2008 were for mean wage 
increases of 3.1%. Matching information on collective 
agreements with longitudinal Social Security records 
on workers, we document two findings. Firstly, the 
probability of job loss between 2009 and 2010 was 1 
percent higher among workers covered by agreements 
signed before the fall of Lehman Brothers than among 
workers covered by contracts signed afterwards. 
Secondly, the analysis of a subsample of contracts 
with information about the exact province-industry-skill 
level minimum wage suggests that the impact of date 
of contract signature on wage changes and employment 
losses is confined to workers whose pre-recession 
earnings were below 1.2 times the contract-specific 
minimum wage. Those findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the staggering of contracts and the 
inability to renegotiate contracts amplify aggregate 
shocks. We end with a discussion of whether those 
results can be extrapolated to other sample periods.
thE spaNIsh prOductIvItY puzzLE IN thE GrEat 
rEcEssION 
LAUrA HoSPIdo ANd EvA MorENo-GALBIS
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1501
See Features section.
FLIGht-tO-LIQuIdItY FLOWs IN thE EurO arEa sOvErEIGN 
dEBt crIsIs 
JUAN ÁNGEL GArCíA ANd rICArdo GIMENo
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1429
In periods of market stress, portfolio reallocations in 
bond markets reflect both safety and liquidity concerns. 
Using sovereign and national agency bonds, we 
construct indicators of liquidity premia in major euro 
area bond markets; we document the weakening of the 
correlation between core and periphery market liquidity 
during the euro area sovereign bond crisis; and we 
identify several episodes of significant flight-to-liquidity 
(FTL) flows above and beyond flight-to-safety (FTS) 
spells in the period 2009-13. We show that FTL flows 
led to significant inverse moves in sovereign bond 
yields in euro area core and periphery markets. 
Moreover, FTL flows triggered declines in core and 
periphery stock markets and are associated with lower 
macroeconomic confidence in the euro area as a whole, 
which underscores the importance of FTL episodes for 
investors and policymakers alike.
MEasurING urBaN aGGLOMEratION. a rEFOuNdatION OF 
thE MEaN cItY-pOpuLatION sIzE INdEx 
ANdrè LEMELIN, FErNANdo rUBIErA-MoroLLÓN ANd ANA 
GÓMEz-LoSCoS
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1430
In this paper, we put forth the view that the potential for 
urbanisation economies increases with interaction 
opportunities. on the basis of that premise, three 
properties are key to an agglomeration index, which 
should: (i) increase with the concentration of population 
and conform to the Pigou-dalton transfer principle; (ii) 
increase with the absolute size of constituent population 
interaction zones; and (iii) be consistent in aggregation. 
Confining our attention to pairwise interactions, and 
invoking the space-analytic foundations of local labour 
market area (LLMA) delineation, we develop an index of 
agglomeration based on the number of interaction 
opportunities per capita in a geographical area. This 
leads to Arriaga’s mean city-population size, which is 
the mathematical expectation of the size of the LLMA in 
which a randomly chosen individual lives. The index has 
other important properties. It does not require an 
arbitrary population threshold to separate urban from 
non-urban areas. It adapts readily to situations where an 
LLMA lies partly outside the geographical area for which 
agglomeration is measured. Finally, it can be satisfactorily 
approximated when data are truncated or aggregated 
into size classes. We apply the index to the Spanish 
NUTS III regions, and evaluate its performance by 
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rEaL WaGE rEspONsIvENEss tO uNEMpLOYMENt IN spaIN: 
asYMMEtrIEs aLONG thE BusINEss cYcLE 
PAULINo FoNT, MArIo IzQUIErdo ANd SErGIo PUENTE
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1504
We estimate real wage cyclicality in the period 
between 1987 and 2013 using a large administrative 
dataset of workers in Spain. real wages are weakly 
procyclical in Spain and, focusing on different phases 
of the business cycle, we find significant differences 
between expansions and recessions, with even lower 
real wage cyclicality in recessions. Furthermore, 
higher levels of unemployment do not translate into 
additional real wage adjustments when the economy 
is contracting, while lower levels of unemployment 
during expansions have incremental effects on wage 
elasticity. This general result holds after accounting 
for differences in tenure, type of contract and age. 
Nevertheless, wages of newly hired workers are the 
most sensitive to the business cycle and exhibit the 
lowest asymmetric pattern between expansions and 
recessions. At the other end of the scale, wages of 
workers with more than six years’ tenure provide the 
most protection against economic downturns. The 
same is true for fixed-term vs. permanent workers and 
for young vs. older workers.
LItIGatION IN spaIN 2001-2010: ExpLOrING thE MarkEt 
FOr LEGaL sErvIcEs 
JUAN S. MorA-SANGUINETTI ANd NUNo GAroUPA
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1505
There is empirical evidence of a cross-country positive 
association between the number of lawyers per capita 
and the extent of litigation. For instance, Spain has more 
litigation and more lawyers per capita than most oECd 
countries. How should this association be interpreted? 
In this paper we analyse the variation in both variables 
across Spanish provinces during the period 2001-2010, 
by means of an instrumental variable approach, to shed 
some light on the sources of the statistical association 
between them. Finally, implications of the results are 
discussed.
sEcurItIzatION aNd BaNks’ capItaL structurE 
ANdrES ALMAzAN, ALFrEdo MArTíN-oLIvEr ANd JESúS SAUrINA
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1506
Asset securitization offers banks the possibility of 
altering their capital structures and the financial 
intermediation process. This study shows that the 
FINaNcE FOr aLL: thE IMpact OF FINaNcIaL LItEracY 
traINING IN cOMpuLsOrY sEcONdarY EducatION IN spaIN 
LAUrA HoSPIdo, ErNESTo vILLANUEvA ANd GEMA zAMArro
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1502
We estimate the impact on objective measures of 
financial literacy of a 10-hour financial education 
program among 15-year-old students in compulsory 
secondary schooling. We use a matched sample of 
students and teachers in Madrid and two different 
estimation strategies. Firstly, we use reweighting 
estimators to compare the performance in a test of 
financial knowledge of students in treatment and control 
schools. In another specification, we use school fixed-
effect estimates of the effect of the course on changes 
in scores in tests of financial knowledge. The program 
increased treated students’ financial knowledge by 
between one-fourth and one-third of a standard 
deviation. We uncover heterogeneous effects, as 
students in private schools did not increase their 
knowledge much, possibly owing to a less intensive 
implementation of the program. Secondly, we analyze 
the bias that arises because the set of schools that 
participate in financial literacy programs is not random. 
Such selection bias is estimated as the pre-program 
performance in financial PISA of students in applicant 
schools relative to a nationally representative sample of 
schools. We then study whether estimators that 
condition on school and parental characteristics 
mitigate selection bias.
spaIN: FrOM IMMIGratION tO EMIGratION? 
MArIo IzQUIErdo, JUAN F. JIMENo ANd AITor LACUESTA
WorKING PAPEr Nº 1503
Since the start of the Great recession the 
unemployment rate in Spain has risen by almost 18 
percentage points. The unemployment crisis is 
affecting all population groups, including the more 
highly educated; but it is even more acute for the 
foreign population, whose unemployment rate is close 
to 40%. This situation follows a period of very high 
immigration flows (1995-2007) that set the number of 
foreigners living in Spain at 11% of the population. 
This paper documents the characteristics of recent 
migration flows to Spain and compares how foreign 
and Spanish nationals are moving abroad and across 
Spanish regions in response to the unemployment 
crisis. Building on this comparison, we shed some 
light on the selection of migrants by educational level 
and offer conjectures as to the implications of the 
migration outflows observed in recent years.
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three stress events, it describes various practical and 
conceptual issues that may arise with the Basel 
benchmark buffer guide – the credit-to-GdP gap – and 
studies a number of complementary indicators. It finds 
that a broad but manageable set of indicators may help 
to improve decision-making in relation to this buffer. 
a MuLtIpLE rEsOLutION schEME FOr spaNIsh GLOBaLLY 
sYstEMIcaLLY IMpOrtaNt BaNkING GrOups
SoNSoLES EIrEA ÁLvArEz Y MANUEL ordÁS FErNÁNdEz
ESTABILIdAd FINANCIErA 27, NovIEMBrE 2014, 61-86.
This paper reviews the regulatory response to the 
problem of institutions which are “too big to fail”. 
Focusing on the key attributes of effective resolution 
regimes for financial institutions, published by the 
Financial Stability Board, it discusses what the main 
features of a resolution strategy should be for Spain’s 
globally systemic banking groups. In view of the business 
models, legal and operational structures and management 
policies of such groups, it proposes the “multiple point of 
entry” approach. It concludes by explaining how a 
resolution might be implemented and discussing the 
challenges that still need to be addressed internationally 
for the effective resolution of such institutions. 
tWO ILLusIONs: cONsOLIdatION aNd capItaL
JorGE PérEz rAMírEz
ESTABILIdAd FINANCIErA 27, NovIEMBrE 2014, 87-110
This paper examines some common practices in the 
assessment of banks’ solvency, under the principles 
and assumptions of accounting theory. More specifically, 
it assesses the potential limitations of using consolidated 
accounting statements as compared with individual 
statements when calculating regulatory solvency ratios. 
It suggests using market prices of the banks’ own funds 
– the stock market value when the bank is listed – as 
complementary useful information for solvency 
assessment in prudential supervision. In each case, the 
paper compares the legal, financial and economic 
aspects to be taken into account when comparing the 
different proposals. 
FIrMs’ FINaNcIaL sOuNdNEss aNd accEss tO capItaL 
MarkEts
ALBErTo FUErTES ANd JoSé MAríA SErENA
ESTABILIdAd FINANCIErA 27, NovIEMBrE 2014, 111-132.
This paper analyses the vulnerability of firms tapping 
international capital markets. Based on information on 
introduction of securitization is associated with 
fundamental changes in the funding policies of banks. 
In particular, we present evidence of more intense use 
of securitization by banks (i) with stronger growth 
opportunities; (ii) with liquidity constraints; (iii) with 
costlier alternative sources of funding; and (iv) with 
restricted access to capital markets owing to adverse 
selection. Securitization is also observed to be higher 
on the pecking order of financing choices of small and 
medium-sized banks and non-listed banks, which are 
likely to face more severe adverse selection problems.
FiNANCiAl STABiliTy JOuRNAl
The Financial Stability Journal (revista de Estabilidad 
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uNa paNOráMIca dE La uNIóN BaNcarIa
dAvId vEGArA FIGUErAS
ESTABILIdAd FINANCIErA 27, NovIEMBrE 2014, 9-30.
After reviewing the background of the banking union, this 
paper analyses the project from a regulatory standpoint 
and, noticing the existing limitations, takes a favourable 
view of the regulatory and institutional initiatives 
undertaken. It concludes with comments on different 
areas which should be paid close attention in the near 
future: the use of bail-ins, the application of the principle 
whereby no creditor should be worse off than in liquidation, 
the need for inter-institutional cooperation, the problem of 
backstops and deposit guarantee schemes. 
thE cOuNtErcYcLIcaL capItaL BuFFEr IN spaIN:  
aN ExpLOratOrY aNaLYsIs OF kEY GuIdING INdIcatOrs
CHrISTIAN CASTro, ÁNGEL ESTrAdA ANd JorGE MArTíNEz
ESTABILIdAd FINANCIErA 27, NovIEMBrE 2014, 31-60.
This paper explores the overall characteristics of the Basel 
III countercyclical capital buffer and its implementation in 
the EU and analyses a set of potential guiding indicators 
for Spain. Based on an empirical exploratory analysis of 
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MINIMuM WaGEs: dO thEY rEaLLY hurt YOuNG pEOpLE?
S. GALÁN ANd S. PUENTE
THE B.E. JoUrNAL oF ECoNoMIC ANALYSIS & PoLICY 15 (1), 
JANUArY 2015, 299-328
MOdEL avEraGING IN EcONOMIcs: aN OvErvIEW
E. MorAL-BENITo
THE JoUrNAL oF ECoNoMIC SUrvEYS 29 (1), FEBrUArY 2015, 46-75
tEstING WEak ExOGENEItY IN cOINtEGratEd paNELs
E. MorAL-BENITo ANd L. SErvéN
APPLIEd ECoNoMICS 47 (30), FEBrUArY 2015, 3216-3228
Is INFrastructurE capItaL prOductIvE? a dYNaMIc 
hEtErOGENEOus apprOach
C. CALdErÓN, E. MorAL-BENITo ANd L. SErvéN
JoUrNAL oF APPLIEd ECoNoMETrICS 30 (2), MArCH 2015, 177-198
LEarNING FrOM ExpErIENcE IN thE stOck MarkEt
A. NAKov ANd G. NUño
JoUrNAL oF ECoNoMIC dYNAMICS ANd CoNTroL. 52, MArCH 2015, 
224-239
dOEs (avEraGE) sIzE MattEr? cOurt ENFOrcEMENt, 
BusINEss dEMOGraphY aNd FIrM GrOWth
M. GArCíA-PoSAdA ANd J. S. MorA-SANGUINETTI
SMALL BUSINESS ECoNoMICS 44 (3), MArCH 2015, 639-669
BaNkING ON sENIOrItY: thE IMF aNd thE sOvErEIGNs’ 
prIvatE crEdItOrs
A. ErCE
GovErNANCE 28 (2), APrIL 2015, 219-236
pEEr EFFEcts IN JudIcIaL dEcIsIONs: EvIdENcE FrOM 
spaNIsh LaBOur cOurts
M. MArTíNEz-MATUTE, Á. MArTíN ANd A. MorAL
INTErNATIoNAL rEvIEW oF LAW ANd ECoNoMICS 42, JUNE 2015, 20-37
FORThCOmiNg ARTiClES  
iN REFEREED JOuRNAlS
a tOOLkIt tO strENGthEN GOvErNMENt BudGEt 
survEILLaNcE
d. J. PEdrEGAL, J. J. PérEz ANd A. J. SÁNCHEz-FUENTES
HACIENdA PúBLICA ESPAñoLA - rEvIEW oF PUBLIC ECoNoMICS
firms from 36 emerging countries in the 2000-2013 
period, it concludes that firms’ balance sheets are not 
currently significantly worse than before the crisis. 
Although firms are less profitable, they have similar 
leverage and a better liquidity and solvency profile. 
However, they can access markets under better 
financial conditions. Finally, beyond this big picture, 
this paper identifies tail risks, such as the increase in 
the volume of issuances by more overstretched firms.
LOaN-LOss rEcOGNItION BY BaNks: puMps IN thE 
rEar-vIEW, BuMps ahEad
PABLo PérEz rodríGUEz
ESTABILIdAd FINANCIErA 27, NovIEMBrE 2014, 133-160.
This paper analyses internal (managerial performance 
assessment) and external (competition in credit 
markets) factors which impact on credit risk valuation 
and pricing in lending decisions. It also examines and 
compares different ways of recognising credit risk in 
bank loan portfolios through loan loss provisioning and 
puts forward some proposals which would give a fairer 
view of the accounting statements. The paper insists 
on the fact that expected loan losses depend largely on 
how lending decisions are made. 
RECENT PuBliCATiONS  
iN REFEREED JOuRNAlS
OptIMaL MONEtarY pOLIcY WIth statE-dEpENdENt 
prIcING
A. NAKov ANd C. THoMAS
INTErNATIoNAL JoUrNAL oF CENTrAL BANKING 10 (3),  
SEPTEMBEr 2014, 49-94
thE IMF GEttING What It NEEds IN (as) thE aFtErMath OF 
thE crIsIs
P. MorENo
ESTUdIoS dE ECoNoMíA APLICAdA 32 (3), SEPTEMBEr 2014, 935-962
LIQuIdItY, tErM sprEads aNd MONEtarY pOLIcY
H. BASSo ANd Y. AKSoY
ECoNoMIC JoUrNAL 124 (581), dECEMBEr 2014, 1234-1278
rEcENt rEFOrMs IN spaNIsh hOusING MarkEts: aN 
EvaLuatION usING a dsGE MOdEL
J.S. MorA-SANGUINETTI ANd M. rUBIo
ECoNoMIC ModELLING 44 (SUPPLEMENT 1), JANUArY 2015, S42-S49
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rEturNs tO skILLs aNd thE dIstrIButION OF WaGEs: 
spaIN 1995–2010
r. CArrASCo, J. F. JIMENo ANd C. orTEGA
oxFord BULLETIN oF ECoNoMICS ANd STATISTICS
rIsk FactOrs aNd thE MaturItY OF suBNatIONaL dEBt: 
aN EMpIrIcaL INvEstIGatION FOr thE casE OF spaIN
J.J. PérEz, ANd r. PrIETo
PUBLIC FINANCE rEvIEW
sOvErEIGN dEBt rEstructurINGs aNd thE IMF: 
IMpLIcatIONs FOr FuturE OFFIcIaL INtErvENtIONs
A. ErCE
JoUrNAL oF CoMPArATIvE ECoNoMICS
thE FaILurE tO prEdIct thE GrEat rEcEssION. a vIEW 
thrOuGh thE rOLE OF crEdIt
G. PérEz-QUIrÓS ANd M.d. GAdEA
JoUrNAL oF THE EUroPEAN ECoNoMIC ASSoCIATIoN
thE saFEtY aNd sOuNdNEss EFFEcts OF BaNk M&a IN thE 
Eu: dOEs prudENtIaL rEGuLatION havE aNY IMpact?
J. HAGENdorFF ANd M. J. NIETo
EUroPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
tOWard a MOrE rELIaBLE pIcturE OF thE EcONOMIc 
actIvItY. aN appLIcatION tO arGENtINa
M. CAMACHo, M. dAL BIANCo ANd J. MArTíNEz-MArTíN
ECoNoMICS LETTErS
a tWIN crIsIs WIth MuLtIpLE BaNks OF IssuE:  
spaIN IN thE 1860s
A. Moro, G. NUño ANd P. TEddE
EUroPEAN rEvIEW oF ECoNoMIC HISTorY
caN WE usE sEasONaLLY adJustEd INdIcatOrs  
IN dYNaMIc FactOr MOdELs?
G. PérEz-QUIrÓS, M. CAMACHo ANd Y. LovCHA
STUdIES IN NoNLINEAr dYNAMICS ANd ECoNoMETrICS
ENtrEprENEurshIp aNd ENFOrcEMENt INstItutIONs: 
dIsaGGrEGatEd EvIdENcE FOr spaIN
M. GArCíA-PoSAdA ANd J. S. MorA-SANGUINETTI
EUroPEAN JoUrNAL oF LAW ANd ECoNoMICS
EstIMatION OF rEGuLatOrY crEdIt rIsk MOdELs
C. PérEz MoNTES
JoUrNAL oF FINANCIAL SErvICES rESEArCH
ExtractING NON LINEar sIGNaLs FrOM sEvEraL 
EcONOMIc INdIcatOrs
G. PérEz-QUIrÓS, M. CAMACHo ANd P. PoNCELA
JoUrNAL oF APPLIEd ECoNoMETrICS
GrOWth EMpIrIcs IN paNEL data uNdEr MOdEL 
uNcErtaINtY aNd WEak ExOGENEItY
E. MorAL-BENITo
JoUrNAL oF APPLIEd ECoNoMETrICS
MEasurING urBaN aGGLOMEratION. a rEFOuNdatION  
OF thE MEaN cItY-pOpuLatION sIzE INdEx
A. LEMELIN, F. rUBIErA-MoroLLÓN ANd A. GÓMEz-LoSCoS
SoCIAL INdICATorS rESEArCH
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RECENT CONFERENCES
LINk tO cONFErENcEs paGE
12th cOMpNEt MEEtING
MAdrId, 25-27 MArCH 2015
on 26 and 27 March 2015, the Banco de España 
hosted the 12th meeting of the Competitiveness 
research Network Working Group (CompNet) at its 
Madrid headquarters. CompNet is led by the ECB and 
other Eurosystem central banks, with other international 
institutions taking part, including the European 
Commission and the oECd, as well as universities and 
research centres. 
Luis Garicano, from the London School of Economics, 
delivered a keynote speech on the reasons why some 
countries have not fully benefited in productivity terms 
from the information technology revolution. Another 
keynote address was given by Gilbert Cette, from the 
Banque de France, on long-term productivity growth in 
Europe. The workshop also included sessions on 
foreign direct investment, international trade, and the 
use of firm-level data for policy analysis. There were 
also workstream sessions that allowed CompNet 
members to work on their specific research projects 
and on the final reports of the network.
To start off the meeting, there was a roundtable 
discussion on 25 March entitled “recovering 
competitiveness: challenges for the Spanish 
economy”. The roundtable included four presentations 
by experts on the Spanish economic situation: Óscar 
Arce (Banco de España), Stefan zeugner (European 
Commission), rafael doménech (BBvA), and diego 
Puga (CEMFI).
RECENT ECONOmiC RESEARCh 
SEmiNARS
LINk tO sEMINars paGE
INtErNatIONaL cOMpEtItIvENEss aNd MONEtarY pOLIcY
GIANCArLo CorSETTI
Cambridge University
10 SEPTEMBEr 2014
FIscaL pOLIcY IN aN uNEMpLOYMENt crIsIs
PoNTUS rENdHAL
Cambridge University
24 SEPTEMBEr 2014
thE uk’s FIscaL rEspONsE tO thE crIsIs
PAUL JoHNSoN
Institute for Fiscal Studies
26 SEPTEMBEr 2014
thE prEcautIONarY savING EFFEct OF GOvErNMENt 
cONsuMptION
vALErIo ErCoLANI
Banco de Portugal
1 oCToBEr 2014
dOvEs FOr thE rIch, haWks FOr thE pOOr?  
dIstrIButIONaL cONsEQuENcEs OF MONEtarY pOLIcY
KEITH KUESTEr
Univ. of Bonn
15 oCToBEr 2014
EvENts
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caN thE prOductIvItY sLOWdOWN IN cONstructION 
ExpLaIN us hOusE prIcEs?
ALESSANdro GALESI
CEMFI
13 JANUArY 2015
thE caLM BEFOrE thE stOrM: tIME varYING vOLatILItY  
aNd thE OrIGINs OF FINaNcIaL crIsEs
oMAr rACHEdI
Univ. Carlos III de Madrid
19 JANUArY 2015
FIscaL austErItY aNd rEputatION
LUCA METELLI
London School of Economics
21 JANUArY 2015
sIGNaLLING FIscaL austErItY
ANNA GIBErT rIvAS
European University Institute
23 JANUArY 2015
aGGrEGatE EFFEcts OF BurEaucratIc startup cOsts
GUzMÁN GoNzÁLEz-TorrES
Stanford Universitiy
26 JANUArY 2015
dOMEstIc dEBt aNd sOvErEIGN dEFauLt
ENrICo MALLUCCI
London School of Economics
2 FEBrUArY 2015
tIME-cONsIstENt MaNaGEMENt OF a LIQuIdItY trap: 
MONEtarY aNd FIscaL pOLIcY WIth dEBt
dMITrY MATvEEv
Univ. Autònoma de Barcelona
3 FEBrUArY 2015
sENtIMENt shOcks as drIvErs OF BusINEss cYcLEs
AGUSTíN ArIAS
Univ. of Mannheim
10 FEBrUArY 2015
traNsMIssION OF MONEtarY pOLIcY OpEratIONs
SILvANA TENrEYro
London School of Economics
22 oCToBEr 2014
tax sYstEMs
JoEL SLEMrod
Univ. of Michigan
29 oCToBEr 2014
BusINEss cYcLE IMpLIcatIONs OF MOrtGaGE sprEads
KArL WALENTIN
Sveriges Riksbank
8 oCToBEr 2014
a GLOBaL assEssMENt OF huMaN capItaL MOBILItY:  
thE rOLE OF NON-OEcd dEstINatIONs
FrédErIC doCQUIEr
Univ. Catholique de Louvain
19 NovEMBEr 2014
thE dIstrIButION OF WEaLth aNd thE MarGINaL 
prOpENsItY tO cONsuME
JIrI SLACALEK
European Central Bank
26 NovEMBEr 2014
sIMuLatING thE rIsk OF cONsuMEr dEBt pOrtFOLIOs
CArLoS MAdEIrA
Banco de Chile
5 NovEMBEr 2014
a pOLItIcaL EcONOMIc thEOrY OF pOpuLIsM  
aNd dIscrIMINatION
GILLES SAINT-PAUL
Paris School of Economics
3 dECEMBEr 2014
cOMpEtItION aNd thE WELFarE GaINs FrOM 
traNspOrtatION INFrastructurE: EvIdENcE  
FrOM thE GOLdEN QuadrILatEraL OF INdIa
MANUEL GArCíA-SANTANA
ECARES
12 JANUArY 2015
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dELEvEraGING. What dELEvEraGING?
PHILIP LANE
Trinity College Dublin
12 FEBrUArY 2015
sEarch FOr YIELd
rAFAEL rEPULLo
CEMFI
19 FEBrUArY 2015
sIzE-dEpENdENt rEGuLatION aNd FactOr INcOME 
dIstrIButION
GABrIEL SMAGGHUE
Univ. Carlos III de Madrid
11 MArCH 2015
FINaNcIaL FrIctIONs, prOduct QuaLItY,  
aNd INtErNatIONaL tradE
roSArIo CrINò
CEMFI
18 MArCH 2015
sIGN rEstrIctIONs, structuraL vEctOr autOrEGrEssIONs, 
aNd usEFuL prIOr INFOrMatION
CHrISTIANE BAUMEISTEr
Bank of Canada
26 MArCH 2015
crEdIt aNd EcONOMIc rEcOvErY: dEMYstIFYING phOENIx 
MIracLEs
ANdrEAS PICK
Erasmus University
7 APrIL 2015
MENu cOsts, EcONOMIc FLuctuatIONs, aNd LarGE shOcks
PETEr KArAdI
European Central Bank
22 APrIL 2015
thE dEtErMINaNts OF LONG-tErM dEBt IssuaNcE  
BY EurOpEaN BaNks: a taLE OF tWO crIsEs
AdrIAN vAN rITxEL
Bank for International Settlements
23 APrIL 2015
INattENtION tO rarE EvENts
MIrKo WIEdErHoLT
Univ. of Frankfurt
28 APrIL 2015
OptIMaL tIME-cONsIstENt GOvErNMENt dEBt MaturItY
dAvIdE dEBorToLI
Univ. Pompeu Fabra
29 APrIL 2015
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PROFilES 
JaviER J. péREz
Unit Head, Public Sector and Fiscal Policy Unit
Economic Policy Analysis Division
Economic Analysis and Forecasting Department
DG Economics, Statistics, and Research
pEOpLE
Javier J. Pérez García joined the Banco de España in 
2008 to head the Fiscal Policy Unit in the Economic 
Analysis and Forecasting Department. After receiving 
his undergraduate and doctoral degrees from the 
Univ. Complutense of Madrid, he taught both at Univ. 
Complutense and at Univ. Pablo de Olavide in 
Seville. From 1999-2001 and 2006-2008 he was 
employed by the Fiscal Policies Division of the 
European Central Bank, where he coordinated fiscal 
forecasting tasks and contributed to policy analysis.
Ru: Before you joined the BdE you spent several 
years in the fiscal policy division of the ECB. what 
did you do there?
A: In the ECB I was coordinating fiscal forecasting, 
preparing projections for the EU as a whole and for 
individual countries, and incorporating fiscal 
forecasts into the overall macro projections. 
I was not originally specialized in fiscal policy – I did 
quantitative macromodeling in general – but it was 
very interesting to participate in an area that 
provided crucial background for monetary policy 
decisions.
Ru: Fiscal forecasting is a central issue now in the 
context of the European crisis. Recently you 
published some reviews of possible new 
monitoring tools for Europe. Tell us about that.
A: Fiscal forecasting became important well before 
the current crisis. Around the time of the adoption of 
the euro, 1999-2000, some countries were failing to 
fulfil their commitments. There was some cheating 
with statistics, and failure to meet targets. of 
course, this is a worldwide issue: all countries revise 
their data, and revisions are often correlated with 
the political cycle and with the business cycle. But 
it is especially important in the context of European 
agreements. 
These issues grabbed my attention, both for day-
to-day policy work and for research, for two main 
reasons. on one hand, in democracies where half of 
GdP passes through the hands of the state, 
governments need to honor their commitments 
because that is something they owe to their 
taxpayers. That’s a basic principle of democracy.
And another more recent issue is that if fiscal policies 
depart very much from ex ante plans, or are very 
random, this creates a lot of aggregate uncertainty. 
Monetary theory teaches that policies need to be 
stable and predictable, so people know what to 
expect in any possible situation. But these ideas are 
not so clearly articulated in the fiscal policy literature. 
Ru: So what are your thoughts about improving 
monitoring or enforcement in Europe?
A: The European monitoring system is too 
complicated, and has a weak connection to 
observed data. It is complicated because there are 
many rules with interrelated criteria. For an outside 
analyst, even for someone who knows the system 
and the data well, it is difficult to anticipate what the 
Commission will say, because there is a lot of room 
for interpretation. To minimize that, you would have 
to simplify the rules. Bold steps have been taken 
recently at the European level to strengthen the 
system, but they also have a downside, since they 
make interpretation even harder.
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And the second issue is that the European system 
is based on evaluating governments’ fulfilment of 
previous targets, and fixing new targets for the 
future. But in between, the question is, what are the 
countries doing now, this quarter – how are they 
implementing their plans?.
Ru: which data are potentially useful for real-time 
evaluation of fiscal policy?
A: The new rules ask countries to produce a lot of 
new quarterly and monthly fiscal data, but those 
data are not yet fully incorporated into the 
assessment system. Typically assessments are 
made only after annual data have been released, or 
are based on forecasts. So this creates a break with 
the current state of nature.
Ru: And so you don’t know about compliance 
until long afterwards, which complicates the 
question of what to do if you observe that rules 
were broken.
A: Exactly. You only know that ex post, it takes 
some time, and in between many things can happen. 
And European institutions are so slow that they may 
miss the problem, and then it is too late to do much. 
So the predictive part has to be reinforced, by 
linking it to short-term data. 
Ru: here at the Bank, and also at the ECB, there 
has been a lot of recent work developing 
“nowcasting” tools that are updated with each 
new statistical data release.
A: Yes. This is useful, because you need to know 
how current policies are affecting the macroeconomy 
today, and it is also useful for monitoring fiscal 
policies themselves. The good thing about 
nowcasting tools is that you can incorporate every 
new data release, and interpret it through a model, 
which provides a dispassionate, nonsubjective look 
at those news.
And also, you can incorporate other types of data in 
these short-term models. A difference in the fiscal 
case, compared with short-term GdP forecasting, 
is that you have information on the future course of 
fiscal policy. Now, in March, we have already 
incorporated data released in January and February, 
but we also know about the government’s fiscal 
plans for the rest of the year. And this is not just a 
forecast, it is embodied in budget law, approved by 
the Parliament. So that budget law should give you 
some information.
Ru: And you have found in the Spanish case, 
empirically, government pronouncements really 
are useful for forecasting.
A: Exactly. And this is important, because the time 
consistency literature, for example, suggests that 
we should not trust what governments say about 
their plans. But when you have a really big change 
in government consumption for example, maybe 
the government claims it will fall by eight percent, 
and in reality it only falls by four. Nonetheless, that 
policy announcement contains useful information 
for forecasting a change in spending. 
Ru: Another interesting finding in your research 
regards the accuracy of government versus 
independent forecasts. Because people often 
assume that we should trust independent agencies 
more than the government.
A: Yes, that is the usual assumption, but it is not 
necessarily true. This matters because the fiscal 
institutional framework is changing, to give more a 
prominent role to the European Commission and 
also to national fiscal councils. So there was this 
discussion, do we need to give more of a role to 
independent national councils, or is it sufficient to 
use the European forecasts?
What we find in our paper is that part of the bias 
that is seen in the government forecasts is inherited 
by European forecasts, and other international 
forecasts. Why? Partly, it is a practical question – it 
is hard for a small team of outsiders to get into the 
tiny details of fiscal decisions, which is where the 
bias accumulates.
And a second thing is that Commission forecasts 
are politically sensitive – for example, they determine 
the depth and speed of any fiscal adjustments 
under the Excessive deficit Procedure. So the 
Commission needs to explain any small deviation of 
their forecast from the fiscal target. Given the level 
of uncertainty that you have in any forecasting area, 
but particularly in the fiscal case, where many 
variables depend directly on government decisions, 
the Commission needs to be prudent. 
And basically, “prudent” means a loss function 
centered around the government’s forecast. If you 
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say that the government will miss its targets, but it 
doesn’t, then you have a problem, because 
governments are stakeholders of the Commission 
too. But if you say that the government is going to 
follow the rules, and then it doesn’t, the Commission 
is perceived as weak. So when you run a regression, 
controlling for things properly, you find that the 
forecast errors of the European Commission are 
correlated with national political cycles. 
Ru: in Spain, under the new European agreements, 
a new fiscal monitoring authority is being 
established right now here in madrid. And some of 
our Banco de España colleagues are helping set 
up their forecasting tools. what structure and role 
do you foresee for that new institution?
A: A fiscal council is very relevant in a country like 
Spain, where there is a great deal of federalism in 
fiscal decisions. Many different administrations 
control large stakes of the budget.
So if one administration is responsible for 
compliance with the stability rules, you also need 
someone to watch the watchdog. The central 
government has to ensure that regional and local 
governments live up to the European and (even 
stricter) national rules. So one important role of the 
fiscal council is to monitor the central government, 
gaining credibility by controlling all these public 
administrations evenhandedly and independently 
under the law. It needs to build trust between 
different administrative levels, because of different 
parties, different sensitivities.
And then there is transparency, which is improving 
in Spain in recent years but still has a way to go. 
More short term information is still needed, 
predictions about the impacts of tax reforms, 
pension reforms, and so forth. Having an 
independent agency that can challenge government 
opinions on these issues will help increase 
transparency. So this is the dual role that the fiscal 
council needs to play.
Ru: what resources and structure will the fiscal 
authority have, and how will it be linked into the 
data flow and the institutional structure of the 
government?
A: It currently has around thirty economists. That is 
more than the Irish or Belgian institutions, for 
example, comparable to the one in Germany, but 
smaller than that of the Netherlands, which is the 
biggest. So they have substantial resources. But 
their staffing needs are greater than in many other 
countries, because they will need to look at 
municipalities and regions, which is complex. 
In terms of structure, there is a macro division, and 
a budgetary division. The macro division is in charge 
of examining the macro projections of the 
government, whether they are prudent or not; and 
also the sustainability of debt, and of the pension 
system. The other core division looks at budgetary 
developments, particularly focussing on the regions. 
one concern about the current setup is that the 
fiscal authority’s budget is controlled by the Finance 
Ministry. That contrasts with the Banco de España, 
which is likewise independent of the government, 
but moreover has its budget decided in the context 
of the Eurosystem.
Ru: Besides the budget, the other crucial 
independence issue is data availability. Because 
the fiscal authority needs data from the 
government, whom it is supposed to be monitoring.
A: on paper, the law grants them access to all 
possible information. But we will have to see 
whether in practice this works. And whether they 
are able to transform this information into a timely 
assessment is linked to the issues we discussed 
before. Another issue is whether they are able to 
share this data with the public, which currently is 
not published. For accountability of the government, 
and of the institution, that is crucial. 
Ru: Earlier, while you were still at the ECB, you 
had a paper on the tradeoff between debt 
reduction and automatic stabilization. in a 
recession, tightening fiscal policy helps control 
debt, but loosening it may stabilize the economy. 
have you reassessed those issues in the light of 
recent events in Europe?
A: That’s a very relevant question today. In theory, 
during a crisis you should let automatic stabilizers 
work, and let public debt act as a shock absorber. 
So it is natural for debt to increase during a crisis, 
and then it should tend back towards a long-run 
steady state as recovery arrives.
Prior to the crisis, Spanish public debt was falling 
steadily, not only because nominal output growth 
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was strong, but also because fiscal policy was 
apparently quite sound, running a surplus. debt fell 
as low as 35 percent of GdP, and then it is normal 
that it rose sharply. But then how far should it 
grow? This raises difficult theoretical questions 
about the optimal level of long-run debt.
Looking around the world, we see that even in 
boom times, developing countries have much 
lower debt levels than developed countries. Why 
does that happen? Can it be extrapolated to 
developed countries? I would say yes. Markets 
have some thresholds – some fiscal limits – above 
which they perceive danger. So one thing the crisis 
taught us is that those thresholds differ across 
countries.
For example in Spain, debt was 30 percentage 
points below the European average prior to the 
crisis. And it has only surpassed that average quite 
recently. But this just shows that the average is not 
really the right reference point. At a certain point, 
the markets started to have doubts about Spain. It 
was strange – they were demanding a high risk 
premium for Spain, because they viewed it as a 
high-debt country. But they were grouping it with 
Italy, and Greece, where the public debt to GdP 
ratio was two or three times higher. So maybe debt 
was indeed high, but only compared to a country-
specific threshold.
So we need more research and analysis not only 
on the sustainable debt level, but also the optimal 
or prudent level that a country can afford, when 
debt acts as a shock absorber. And what is the 
threshold, where you approach the razor’s edge. 
Beyond purely empirical benchmarks like the 
reinhart-rogoff ninety percent threshold, we need 
better theoretical grounding and also more policy-
oriented country-specific research.
Ru: you have also investigated the relationship 
between public and private wages. in your work, 
which of these do you see as the driving force, 
and which one is responding?
A: Yes, I’m still working on these issues, as a member 
of the Eurosystem Working Group on Public 
Finances. In theory, productivity should be the 
driving force behind all wages in the economy, and 
competition should align them across the private 
and public sectors. on the other hand, public 
workers are in the nontradeable sector, where there 
is less competitive pressure, and even within that 
sector they are more protected. So if this duality is 
strong, public wages can hurt competitiveness when 
they fall out of line with private productivity.
Leadership also depends on country-specific 
factors. Union density tends to be high in the public 
sector, which may create powerful “envy effects”. It 
may also depend on the degree of centralization of 
wage bargaining. For example, some recent 
literature stresses that in Italy, public bargaining 
tends to set wages equally in the North and in the 
South, but private wages are lower in the South. So 
this creates a distortion. on the other hand, 
openness can reduce the impact of public wages. 
There is a lot of cross-country heterogeneity in 
these factors, so empirically public wages impact 
the private sector in some countries but not others.
However, in recessions, public wage leadership 
may even be positive. For example, in Spain, as the 
crisis began, the private sector adjusted largely by 
firing, without changes in the wages of “insiders”. 
Unemployment rose as high as 25% because most 
of the adjustment was done by quantities, rather 
than prices. So when wages of civil servants were 
frozen, or reduced, this promoted price adjustment 
in the private sector – though without statistical 
analysis this is just anecdotal, since it was 
simultaneous with some labor market reforms. 
I have a recent paper on this with Ana Lamo and 
Enrique Moral, in which we allow for different 
linkages between public and private wages in 
recessionary and expansionary times. Looking at 
the impulse response function, you can see that 
there is potential for government wage setting to 
create a virtuous circle of adjustment by prices, 
instead of quantity adjustments that drive everyone 
into unemployment. So in the Spanish case the 
shock to public wages appears to have facilitated 
the adjustment of private wages. 
Ru: That is somewhat surprising, since public 
wages were still rising in 2009, when unemployment 
was already rising quickly.
A: That is true, but private wages were still rising 
too. Public wages started to decrease in 2010. But 
the unique thing about Spain is that in 2008 and 
2009, in spite of a surge of unemployment, public 
and private wages were still growing. Even in the 
construction sector, collective agreements were still 
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NEw FACES
Laura Crespo 
Staff economist
Research Division
Monetary and Financial Studies Department
Laura crEspO joined the research division of the 
Banco de España in February 2015. She specialises 
in the design, production, and use of survey data as 
part of the team that conducts the Spanish Survey 
of Household Finances (EFF). Previously, since 
April 2006, she was a senior researcher at CEMFI, 
where she was in charge of the implementation of 
the Survey of Health, Ageing and retirement in 
Europe (SHArE) in Spain as part of the Spanish 
country team. Laura obtained her Ph.d in Economics 
from the University of Alicante in 2007, and holds 
an M.Sc in Economics from Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra. during her graduate studies she was granted 
research fellowships from the ramón Areces 
foundation and the Marie Curie Training Site 
Programme of the European Commission. She also 
worked as research assistant and affiliate Ph.d 
student at the Centre for Applied Microeconometrics, 
University of Copenhagen, during one year. 
Laura does empirical research in the fields of 
labour economics, economics of ageing, and 
applied microeconometrics broadly defined. She 
also has methodological interests in the design 
and implementation of survey data collection. 
Specifically, she has investigated the validity of 
several theoretical models of household labour 
supply to explain decisions of Spanish households 
using data from the European Community Household 
Panel. She has also analysed the relationship 
between parental health, caregiving and employment 
status of middle-aged women, and the protective 
effect of education on several dimensions of mental 
health such as depression and memory for several 
European countries using data from SHArE. 
Laura is currently working on a comparative 
analysis of European and US life expectancy 
differentials by education levels, as well as on the 
estimation of the causal effect of retirement on 
individuals’ cognition. Both studies are based on 
data drawn from SHArE.
rEsEarch WEBsItE: 
https://sites.google.com/site/lauracrespoweb/
increasing private wages at that time, when the 
sector was already shrinking. There was really no 
adjustment in private wages until 2011 or 2012. But 
the public wage adjustment started already in 2010.
So that is why I say that our empirical estimates are 
consistent with this anecdotal example from the 
recent crisis. only when the public sector started 
controlling its wages, the private sector followed. 
Since it employs three million people, around fifteen 
percent of total Spanish employment, the public 
sector acts as a reference for wage negotiations in 
other sectors.
rEsEarch paGE: 
http://www.bde.es/investigador/staff/95.htm
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TRiNO-MaNuEl ÑíguEz gRau
Senior Lecturer, Westminster Business School
University of Westminster, London
trINO-MaNuEL ÑíGuEz Grau obtained his bachelor’s 
degree in economics at the University of Alicante in 
1998 and completed his Phd in Economics from the 
University of Alicante in 2004. In 2003 and 2004 he 
was a research scholar and graduate teaching 
assistant at the London School of Economics. He has 
been a Senior Lecturer in Economics at Westminster 
Business School since 2005, and a faculty member at 
New York University in London since 2010. He also 
worked for the Spanish government as a professional 
clarinetist from 1987 to 1992, obtaining a degree as a 
teacher of clarinet from the Superior Conservatory of 
Music “oscar Espla” of Alicante in 1994.
His research interests fall in the areas of econometric 
theory, financial econometrics, portfolio decision 
theory, and forecasting. He has published his work 
in Economics Letters, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, International Journal of Forecasting, 
Quantitative Finance, SERIEs, and the Journal of 
Forecasting, among other journals. Trino-Manuel is 
visiting the research division from February until 
July 2015. His research at the Banco de España 
focuses on: (1) the importance of higher-order 
statistical moments and risk preference properties 
in optimal portfolio choice, with applications to 
economic modelling and forecasting under high 
levels of uncertainty, and (2) semi-parametric 
densities for multivariate volatility models as a 
feasibly parameterized way to  represent conditional 
correlations, skewness and heavy tails observed in 
empirical distributions.
rEsEarch paGE: 
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/about-us/ 
our-people/directory/niguez-trino
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23rd cEpr EurOpEaN suMMEr sYMpOsIuM  
IN INtErNatIONaL MacrOEcONOMIcs (EssIM)  
rOda dE Bará, tarraGONa
TArrAGoNA, 26-29 MAY, 2015
HoST: BANCo dE ESPAñA
The 23rd CEPr European Summer Symposium in 
International Macroeconomics (ESSIM) will take place 
26-29 May 2015 at the Banco de España facilities in 
Tarragona, Spain. 
ESSIM is an annual meeting that brings together about 75 
economists from across Europe and key researchers from 
outside the region to focus on international economics 
and other areas of macroeconomics. It provides a 
unique opportunity for macroeconomists from different 
institutions and countries to discuss research, and for 
young researchers to meet and discuss their work with 
senior economists. The programme combines workshop 
sessions with time for collaboration and consultation.
4th WB-BE pOLIcY cONFErENcE: thE EcONOMIc 
chaLLENGEs assOcIatEd WIth rIsING (aNd FaLLING) 
INEQuaLItY
MAdrId, 8 JUNE 2015
on June 8, the Banco de España will host its Fourth 
Joint Conference with the World Bank, entitled “The 
economic challenges associated with rising (and 
falling) inequality”. The goal of the conference is to 
bring together academics and policy makers to 
discuss the challenges that inequality represents for 
modern economies. In a keynote speech, Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura will place present inequality in 
a historical perspective. There will also be two round 
table discussions. In the first, Leonardo Gasparini 
(CEdLAS-Univ. Nacional de La Plata), Augusto de la 
Torre (World Bank) and Santiago Levy (Inter-American 
development Bank) will discuss recent developments in 
inequality in Latin America. In the second, Marcelo 
olarreaga (Univ. de Genève), romain ranciere (Paris 
aNNOuNcEMENts
uPCOmiNg CONFERENCES
LINk tO cONFErENcEs paGE
structuraL rEFOrMs IN thE WakE OF rEcOvErY:  
WhErE dO WE staNd
MAdrId, 18-19 JUNE 2015
on 18-19 June 2015, the Banco de España will host a 
research conference, jointly organized with Banque de 
France, entitled “Structural reforms in the wake of 
recovery: where do we stand?” The conference seeks 
to bring together academics and policy-makers to 
discuss the aggregate implications of structural 
reforms, including reforms in labor and product 
markets, and in fiscal frameworks. The event is open to 
both theoretical and empirical analyses. Confirmed 
speakers include Yann Algan (Sciences Po Paris), Jordi 
Galí (UPF), Luis Garicano (LSE) and Francesco Giavazzi 
(U Bocconi). The scientific committee includes Tullio 
Jappelli (Naples), Casey Mulligan (Chicago), Jesús 
Fernández-villaverde (Pennsylvania), Marco Celentani 
(Carlos III), Fabio Ghironi (Washington), and Gerard 
Llobet (CEMFI). Finally, the conference will include a 
policy panel featuring Frank Smets (ECB), vitor Gaspar 
(IMF), Alain de Serres (oECd) and Marcel Fratzscher 
(dIW Berlin). 
sEvENth hIGh-LEvEL pOLIcY dIaLOGuE OF thE 
EurOsYstEM aNd LatIN aMErIcaN cENtraL BaNks 
MAdrId, 29 JUNE 2015
This meeting will be hosted by the Banco de España in 
Madrid on 29 June 2015 (following the BIS Annual 
General Meeting in Basel). The 2015 edition will focus 
on issues under the heading “Monetary policy, macro-
prudential policy and financial stability – experiences 
from advanced and emerging economies”, with policy 
relevance for both the European and Latin American 
regions.
School of Economics) and Andrea Brandolini (Banca 
d’Italia) will elaborate on the macroeconomic implications 
of inequality.
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